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BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
• Background
– Weapon system investments capture a significant share of  
defense budgets
– Strong emphasis on “Jointness” generated by new Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
• Challenges
– Could benefits of “Jointness” be lost through increased cost 
and schedule breaches?
– Can Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) offer insights to  
mitigate adverse program outcomes from increased 
interdependence of Joint programs?
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Implications of JCIDS joint “Capabilities Focus”
in Systems Acquisition
• DoD emphasizes investments in “capabilities” to support 
Joint Operations
– Focus on benefits of multiple systems working together in a 
‘systems of systems’ (SoS) or ‘net-centric’ context
– Existing (legacy) and new systems are required to work together 
towards the capability objective
• In most cases, DoD acquires individual systems
– Systems, programs defined to fulfill specific requirements, 
usually in functional, service-specific terms
– Capability-oriented needs (e.g., net-centric, SoS) may put 
added demands on systems beyond specified requirements
– This places additional risks, costs & constraints on program 
execution
• Programs required to attend to “external” issues or be impacted by 
them (interdependencies)
• Difficult to capture in baseline estimates
• Manifested as cost growth, schedule delay & performance shortfall











Are linear assumptions valid?
Which assumptions are?
Are we measuring the right 
drivers of cost/schedule?
As the magnitude and 
complexity of DoD systems 
increase, how do we develop
Realistic cost, schedule, 
& performance baselines?
Nagging Questions
Size, SLOC, # of Users, # of Interfaces, 
# of Systems, etc.
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DoD manages at the “Program” level 
and engineers at the “System” level
Current Assessment of Interdependence
• PRO:
• Identifies Programs in context of 
known dependencies
• Provides indications of criticality, 
directionality, and timing
• CON:
• Subjective assessment of critical 
dependencies
• Not repeatable or consistent from 
report to report
• Subject to interpretation or “filtering”
• Not comprehensive
• Combines multiple types of 
interdependence without clear 
distinction





















Interrelationships, Dependencies and Synchronization 


















Solid denotes current system
Dash denotes future sy stem
Arrow to CEC denotes supports CEC
Arrow from CEC denotes CEC supports
Indicates program are interdependent
No known issues affecting inter-related 
programsResolvable  interface issues affecting 











• Combined data from DAES 
Interdependence charts on 78 
MDAPS, resulting in:
– 442 unique programs of 
record identified as being 
interdependent in some way
– 989 unique linkages 
identified
• 804 links (81%) are coded 
“green” (shown here as gray)
• 177 links (18%) are coded 
“yellow”
• 8 links (1%) are coded “red”
• Interdependencies exist 
among all MDAPS
• Most interdependencies with 
and among non-MDAPs
Exploring Cost Implications of Complexity
• Development cost appears to be correlated with number of entities involved
• Nonlinear relationship suggest # of linkages contribute significantly to total cost























• Architectures of programs gives insight into interdependencies and 
thus complexity
Interdependence & Complexity
• Recurring theme of “Interdependence” among 
individual entities
– Among units in an operational context
– Among systems in the engineering context
– Among programs in the acquisition context
• Interdependence exists in SoS, etc., but also in 
absence of explicit aggregation
– No program is an “island”
• Complexity of the problem / solution space driven by 
the number of entities to be coordinated / integrated
Interdependence emerging as an important driver 
of complexity in current acquisition environment
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THE TCE MODEL
• The Main insight of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
is that understanding certain key characteristics of a 
transaction can help anticipate two significant, but 
frequently neglected weapon system costs: 
“Coordination” and “Motivation” costs.
• Understanding underlying characteristics that drive 
transaction costs can help guide optimal choice of 
governance (contractual and other) mechanisms.
• Goal of TCE: Design governance mechanisms that 
minimize coordination costs and the costs of 
motivating effort, and that spur specific investments, to 
achieve “Better, Faster, Cheaper.”
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Key Characteristics of Defense Transactions:
1. Complexity 
– What is the extent of Interdependence?
2. Uncertainty
– Imperfect Information: Do we know Demand/Quantity, Cost, Schedule, 
Performance/Quality? Can we specify all possible contingencies in 
the contract?
– Asymmetric information: Does someone have information advantage? 
How can we elicit truth-telling? 
3. Frequency
– One-shot or repeated transaction? Does reputation matter?
4. Time Criticality
– Wartime or peacetime? How insensitive to price in emergencies?
5. Asset Specificity
– What are incentives for parties to invest in specific assets?
6. Market Contestability
– Is there ex-ante competition? What about ex-post?
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The TCE Model: “Transaction Costs”
• COORDINATION COSTS
– Planning: Identify Alternatives
• Search & Information Costs
• Costs to acquire timely, accurate & relevant information (AoA)
– Programming: Choose an Alternative
• Decision & Bargaining Costs (source selection) 
• Costs of negotiating and writing contracts
– Budgeting & Execution
• Policing & Enforcement Costs 
• Costs of paying, executing, monitoring, measuring, and 
evaluating contracts (and re-negotiation)
• MOTIVATION COSTS
– Costs of Encouraging Specific Investments & 
Countering Opportunistic Behavior
– Specific Asset investments can lead to “Hold-Up”
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Transaction-Specific Asset Investments
(Specific assets lose their value in alternative use) 
• Examples of Specific Assets :
• Physical Assets (specialized equipment)
• Human Assets (special skills,  knowledge, training)
• Site Specificity (special location that economizes on 
inventory (EOQ), transport costs)
• Temporal Specificity (investment in key bottleneck 
activities (PERT/CPM) that impact overall project 
completion costs and schedules)
• The “HOLD UP” Problem




• To Cut Coordination & Motivation Costs of Joint SoS
– Reduce complexity
• Invest in more complete contract (search & information costs)
• Use Mature technology
– Reduce uncertainty
• Invest in more complete contract (bargaining & decision costs)
• Measurement, Monitoring to reduce information asymmetries
• Credible deterrents (enforcement, penalty clauses, warranties/bonding)
• Align interests to induce truth-telling (accurate forecasts, etc.)
– Increase frequency
• Multi-year contracts 
• Screening & selection using Reputation (incentive to build “goodwill”) 
– Address asset specificity
• Reduce government requirements for specific investments
• Design governance mechanisms that protect specific investments
– Government Furnished Equipment, GOCO facilities, etc.
– Increase contestability
• Preserve some Government Standby Capacity/Expertise 
• Credible Threat of vertical integration (“backsourcing”)
TESTING THE MODEL
• System of Systems (SoS)
– Interdependence: Independent systems combined/integrated 
into a larger system to provide unique capabilities
– Hypothesis: Increased coordination and motivation costs 
from complexity, uncertainty, and issues of asset specificity, 
manifested in cost and schedule breaches.
• Joint System
– A defense system that involves more than one service 
during any phase of the program (development, production, 
operation)
– Hypothesis: Increased coordination and motivation costs 
from complexity, uncertainty, and issues of asset specificity, 
manifested in cost and schedule breaches.
METHODOLOGY
• 84 Major Defense Acquisition Programs were examined 
for baseline breaches:
– Schedule
– Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E)
– Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)
– Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC)
• System of System vs. Single System 
– originally examined by Brown, Flowe, & Hamel, 2007
• Joint Service vs. Single Service 
• Kruskal-Wallis (H-test) to determine if there was a 
significant difference in the mean rank of breaches























breaches 34.36 49.56 0.0039 38.56 51.31 0.0246
RDT&E 
breaches 32.44 51.22 0.0002 39.34 49.56 0.0631
PAUC 
breaches 39.14 45.41 0.2244 41.70 44.29 0.6418
APUC 
breaches 39.60 45.01 0.2633 42.09 43.42 0.7977
Preliminary Results
• In this sample, System-of-Systems (SoS) programs had  
significantly higher risk of cost and schedule breaches than 
single system acquisition programs. 
• While “Jointness” by itself explained schedule overruns, it only 
weakly explained cost growth. 
– The mild impact on cost growth could be because “Joint programs” in our 
sample included a mix of single “Systems” and “Systems-of-Systems”
(SoS).
• Future research should test whether Jointness in SoS programs 
attenuate or reinforces cost and schedule breaches. 
– Jointness might Attenuate SoS outcomes if, once approved, consensus 
is required to make any changes in the program so few changes occur.
– Jointness might Reinforce SoS outcomes if increasing the number of 
players increases complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity.
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Interdependence isn’t “bad”, it just “is”
• Joint Operations require interdependence
– Multiple systems working together in a ‘systems of systems’ (SoS)
• Interdependence exists within SoS, FoS, Portfolios, Force 
Capability Packages, or in the absence such 
designations
• Interdependence among systems and programs is 
unavoidable, in fact, it is essential
• Pro:  Enables the Joint Force:  
– flexibility, agility, mass, maneuver, etc.
• Con: Has the potential for adverse “emergent” behaviors due 
to complexity
Essential to understand interdependence and 
its effects
Dealing with Interdependence & Complexity
• Recognize interdependence exists in distinct contexts
– Among units in an operational setting
– Among systems in the engineering setting
– Among programs in the acquisition setting
• Each context has distinct characteristics and effects, 
involves different “players” with distinct interests & 
equities
– Essential to acknowledge and “harmonize” among these domains
• DoD must learn to effectively manage interdependence 
and the complexity it engenders
Conclusions
• Interdependence is significantly correlated with cost and schedule 
overruns and therefore should be examined as an important factor in 
Joint SoS programs
• Interdependence is manifested as several key characteristics in defense 
transactions: Complexity, Uncertainty and issues of Asset Specificity.
• TCE recommends focusing on these key characteristics to help design 
contracts and other governance mechanisms to anticipate and mitigate 
potentially adverse (cost, schedule, performance) outcomes.
– Use TCE for basis of contract types and incentive structures  
– Manage the relationship and ownership of specific assets
– Anticipate how transactions might change due to Jointness
• The Main insight of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is that 
understanding certain key characteristics of a transaction can help 
design governance mechanisms that minimize coordination costs
and the costs of motivating effort, and that spur specific 
investments, to achieve “Better, Faster, Cheaper.”
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1. Multi-Year Contracting and Frequency
2. Integrated Product and Process Development and Asset 
Ownership
3. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) – Heightened 
Awareness/Shared Risk
4. Alpha Contracting for ex-ante Discovery
5. Evolutionary Acquisition Addresses Uncertainty 
Incrementally
6. Single Process Initiative Uses Frequency and Specialization
7. Reputation and the Use of Past Performance Data and Award 
for Best Value
Back-Up Slide
Current Acquisition Practices Address Some TCE Concerns
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Back-up Slide
• A principal insight of TCE is that the choice of optimal 
governance structure (contracts, warranties, bonding, 
GOCO, etc.) depends on the characteristics of the 
transaction.
• Understanding transaction characteristics can 
improve outcomes if:
– Transactions are sorted into categories based on their 
principal characteristics (complexity, uncertainty, 
frequency, asset specificity, market contestability)
• Alternative Governance Mechanisms: lifetime employment 
(fixed price contracts); bonuses, promotions & pay-for-
performance (incentive contracts); efficiency wages (extra 
profits); deferred compensation (contract completion 
bonuses); screening & selection (reputation); posting bonds 




• Among all MDAP’s (1995-2005) most cost growth 
comes from estimating errors in program baselines 
(MDAP’s mostly experienced schedule and PAUC 
breaches)
– cost estimating must anticipate re-negotiation costs (hold-up, 
change orders, etc.) that can rapidly overwhelm initial 
“production” cost estimates.
– If these ex-post opportunistic transaction costs are ignored, 
then future cost increases may not be properly anticipated.
– Transactions that require specific investments normally 
also require credible protection against early 
termination or opportunistic re-negotiation.
• Multi-year contracts (long-term contractual relationship)
• Posting a bond (enforceable termination commitments)
• Reputation
